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America’s Role in the World
Jason Edwards

As the United States transitions to the new Obama
administration, American foreign policy has a serious
debate that is occurring, albeit subtly, among pundits,
politicians and policymakers: what should the role of
the United States be within the world? In fact, this
question has been a bone of contention through the
history of American foreign policy, particularly during
times of transition such as the end of the SpanishAmerican War, World War I and II. Today, we are also in
a period of transition. America’s image has been badly
damaged by military missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and many write that the United States is on the decline
and that it will eventually lose its might, as has every
major power has since the beginning of recorded history. What America’s role should be is the fundamental
question that animates my current research and the
subject of this account. In the following paragraphs,
I provide a synopsis of that debate, how President
Clinton dealt with this subject, and where it might
go from here.
During the 1990s, I became fascinated by how the
United States would enact its role as world leader without a Soviet enemy. I was particularly interested in how
President Clinton managed this new era. I became interested in Clinton because he was a key transition figure
as the United States moved from the Cold War to an age
of globalization and because of the level of foreign policy activity that occurred during his administration. Yet
Clinton would not be able to rely on the rhetorical
conventions of the previous era. As a result, I asked how
would Clinton rhetorically guide the United States
without the luxury of the Cold War? Would the U.S.
become more internationalist or retrench and become
isolationist? When, where, and why would the United
States use force? What would replace containment as
America’s grand strategy? These questions and others
led me to write my recently released book: Navigating
the Post Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy
Rhetoric. In Navigating, I argue that Clinton was able to
provide a vision for U.S. foreign policy by modifying
and adapting America’s foreign policy vocabulary—a set
of underlying beliefs, assumptions, ideals, and conventions that all presidents draw upon in their foreign
policy rhetoric. What makes each president unique are
the specific modifications and contributions made to

this lexis. These alterations tell us as much about the
president as they do about the circumstances he faced in
making foreign policy. The modifications made by a
president create a rhetorical signature for his presidency
and a symbolic legacy in foreign relations that influences future administrations. Navigating the Post-Cold
War World is my analysis of the rhetorical signature that
Clinton created, how he used his discourse to shape and
manage this new era of globalization, and the symbolic
legacy he left for future administrations.
One specific area of analysis was America’s role in the
world. I dedicate an entire chapter to outlining the
various rhetorical strategies that Clinton used to maintain and extend America’s role as world leader. What is
central to this article and the focus of my current research project is what influences the debate over the
U.S. role in foreign relations. In writing Navigating, I
found that this debate is premised by various strands of
American exceptionalism.
American exceptionalism is the distinct belief that the
United States is a unique, if not superior, nation that
has a special role to play in human history. In his famous treatise, Democracy in America, Alexis de
Tocqueville was the first person to reference America as
exceptional, but our exceptionalist roots can be traced
much earlier to the colonial period. Puritan leader John
Winthrop proclaimed that the Massachusetts Bay colony was going to be a “new Israel” that would be a “shining city upon a hill” for the world to emulate. Later,
Thomas Paine, writing in Common Sense, pronounced
that the American colonies had the “power to begin the
world over again.” This power led many to believe that
through America’s providential nature, it could escape
the trappings of monarchy, a hereditary elite, and other
ills that plagued Europe in the late eighteenth century.
Eventually, this exceptionalist belief became engrained
in American political culture. Today, most public figures
find no fault with the idea that the U.S. is not only a
unique nation, but larger superior to other states around
the world.
Generally, three basic tenets make up Americans’ belief
that theirs is a chosen nation. First, the United States is
a special nation with a special destiny. Second, the
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United States is qualitatively different than other nations. Third,
exceptionalists believe that the
United States can escape the problems that eventually plague all
states. Taken together, these exceptionalist tenets function to give
Americans order to their vision of
the world and their place within it.
American exceptionalism largely
defines how the United States sees
itself within the international
order. However, what the United
States’ specific role should be, how
it is enacted, and what activities
can be sanctioned to fulfill these exceptional qualities
has been a matter of debate for decades. Two distinct
traditions of how the U.S. fulfills its special destiny have
been projected by American politicians. These two
traditions are known as the mission of exemplar and the
mission of intervention. According to exemplarists,
America’s role in the world is to stand apart from the
rest of the world and serve as a model of social and
political responsibility. In order for the United States to
fulfill its exceptionalism, it should engage in activities
that make itself a beacon for the world to emulate, such
as increasing material prosperity, integrating diverse
communities into one America and working for more
civil rights. Yet exemplarists argue that being a model
for the world is a full-time job. Engaging in other activities, such as intervening in the affairs of other states,
puts an undue burden on the American people and
could risk domestic gains that it has made at home. This
basic credo was largely followed by early American
political leaders. President George Washington warned
the young republic in his Farewell Address to stay away
from “permanent alliances” which may stunt its
growth. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson
argued that America’s foreign policy would be to “seek
peace, commerce, and friendship with all, but entangling alliances with none.” Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams maintained that the United States does not go
“abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Rather, it is
the “well-wisher of freedom and independence to all.”
These examples yield the idea that this exemplarist
foreign policy tradition has largely been a constraint
upon American action, keeping it out of the political
affairs of states during the nineteenth century.
On the other side of this debate are proponents of the
mission of intervention. Interventionists maintain that
America best demonstrates its exceptionalism by active
engagement with the world on economic, political,
social and cultural terms. These advocates claim that
the U.S. cannot stay out of the affairs of other nations
and organizations. The world is too integrated, too

interconnected. Rather, America, because
of its providential heritage, has a duty
and a responsibility to lead the world
toward more democracy, more freedom,
and more liberty, while defending those
who subscribe or attempt to subscribe to
similar ideals. Largely, the proponents of
this mission have been twentieth-century
politicians. In the debate over the fate of
the Philippines, President William
McKinley argued that America’s purpose
was to “civilize” the population and
“rescue” them from their “savage” nature.
On the eve of the U.S. entering World
War I, President Wilson argued that the
United States must intervene to make the “world safe
for democracy.” During his Truman Doctrine address,
President Truman stated that the “free peoples of the
world look to the United States to help maintain their
freedoms.” In his inaugural address, President Kennedy
promised that the United States “would bear any burden” and “oppose any foe to assure the success of liberty.” Ultimately, these examples demonstrate that
American politicians have come to argue that it is
America’s responsibility, as the “leader of the free
world,” to actively defend and promote the spread of
democracy for its own interests and for the international community. America’s exceptional heritage is fulfilled
by engaging in this interventionist mission.
Over the past one hundred years, exemplarists and
interventionists have often been at odds with each
other. Each camp has a distinct vision of what the
United States should do to best influence the affairs of
the world. At times in American history, these visions
come into direct conflict. Some of these examples include the imperialism debate during the Spanish
American War in the late nineteenth century, the debate
over America’s inclusion in the League of Nations at the
end of World War I, and the debate over whether the
United States should actively be in the conflict during
World War II. With the end of the Cold War, the debate
over America’s role in the world exploded again.
Exemplarists launched an active media campaign that it
was time for the United States to retrench. For example,
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, a staunch cold warrior, advocated that
since the United States won the Cold War that it should
return to its “normal” foreign policy of nineteenth century exemplarism. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Patrick Buchanan advocated that the United States should discontinue foreign
aid, withdraw troops from South Korea and Europe,
defund all international organizations, and return to its
former policy of no entangling alliances. During that
campaign, Buchanan’s basic ideal of American retrench-

ment was shared by Democratic presidential candidates, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder and Iowa
Senator Tom Harkin. The views of Kirkpatrick,
Buchanan, Wilder, and Harkin caused, according to
presidential historian H.W. Brands, a crisis in thinking
about America’s place in the world.
Amidst this post-Cold War crisis, President Clinton
articulated his position of what America’s role would
be. What was unique about Clinton, as I argue in
Navigating, was that he bridged these diametrically
opposed camps by fusing the exemplarist and interventionist narratives together. The president’s argument
went something like this: the United States must maintain its interventionist leadership role, but he predicated
that leadership upon the renewal of its domestic example. By fusing the two narratives together he removed
the inherent tension between the two camps and provided a logic for the United States to fulfill its exceptionalist destiny by being strong at home so that it could
maintain its global role as world leader.
In fusing these narratives together, President Clinton
made specific arguments about fulfilling each mission.
For Clinton, fulfilling the mission of exemplar required
the United States do three things. First, the president
asserted the United States must change the way it
thinks about the international environment. Clinton
was one of the first political leaders to recognize, get
out in front, and talk about the dramatic changes that
globalization brought to the lives of people around
the world. For Clinton, globalization was an inevitable
reality. No country could escape it. The massive changes
created both opportunities and challenges. The United
States could make globalization its friend or its foe,
but if America wanted to win it had to realize that it
must adapt, manage, and direct this new era toward
American interests. According to Clinton’s logic,
modifications to this era began with the United States
re-establishing itself as an example for the rest of
the world.
For Clinton, restoring America’s exemplar heritage
began with rebuilding its domestic economy. When
Clinton entered office, the U.S. was just beginning to
recover from the early 1990s recession. However, the
president asserted throughout the 1992 presidential
campaign and in the early days of his presidency that
America’s prior generation of political leaders (primarily
Republican presidents) had done little to equip the
United States to deal with the new realities of the global
economy. America had not set out on an aggressive
campaign of retooling industries to meet global demand, it had not expanded its trade agreements with
other countries, and it had not reeducated its population to learn new skills that could be used in an era of

globalization. As a result, the United States was behind
other nations and it was no longer the most dynamic,
creative economy in the world. To remedy this situation, the president asserted that the U.S. must get its
economic house in order. It must reeducate its population, it must expand its trade agreements, and it must
retool the economy for
more exports; all of which
the administration accomplished in its eight year
foreign policy stint.
Evidence of these accomplishments were constantly touted by Clinton: the
negotiation of over 300
bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements, the
creation of 22 million jobs,
the expansion of American
exports, the general rise of
American wages, and the
growth in direct foreign
investment, along with
other economic accomplishments, were proof that the United States’s status
as an exemplar nation was redeemed. In turn, this
evidence positioned to maintain its station of global
leadership.
Additionally, President Clinton maintained the United
States must improve the overall American community
to reaffirm its exemplar status. One of the things that
the president consistently highlighted was America’s
diversity, a diversity in which hundreds of different
groups—racial, ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic—
live in relative harmony. The ability of diverse populations to live in peace acted as grounds to warrant continued U.S. leadership. The United States acted as a
model for other nations with diversity problems. That
said, Clinton argued there was room for improvement.
The president made racial reconciliation, with his second-term initiative of “One America,” the centerpiece of
his domestic agenda. He wanted Americans to converse
on the subject of race and how it impeded their progress
toward a “more perfect union.” Although, the president
did not succeed with many of his One America initiatives, he moved the debate on race further than had any
president for thirty years. Clinton’s attempt to deepen
our appreciation for diversity positioned the United
States as a leader in a multicultural world, renewed its
exemplarist role.
While Clinton’s discourse in the context of the exemplar mission provided rhetorical grounds to continue
U.S. global leadership, he also stated that we would not
retreat from our interventionist role as world leader. In
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an age of globalism, America was the “indispensable
nation” to provide leadership in shaping, managing and
directing this new era. In fulfilling the mission of intervention, the president spent most of his time making
the case why the U.S. should continue its station as the
“indispensable nation.” The case for leadership was
contained in two overarching and overlapping claims.
The first involved our role as world leader and the legacy
of transitional leadership that American generations
had shown in the past. In particular, Clinton constantly
compared and analogized the U.S. position in the 1990s
with that of America in the 1940s. According to the
president’s logic, the United States did not shrink from
its leadership role in the great transition from World
War II and under his leadership it would not shrink
from leading the world in transitioning to an age of
globalization. By maintaining and expanding its leadership role, the United States continued the legacy of
leadership left by America’s “greatest generation.” In
doing so, the “globalization generation”—and by extension Clinton—became models for future generations to
emulate. By continuing the intervention mission the
“globalization generation” had the potential to be as
important as the “greatest generation.”
The second claim Clinton made was that U.S. leadership was needed to mold and direct this era toward its
interests. Embedded within this argument was a sense
of urgency and immediateness. For example, Clinton
told a national audience in his 1993 Address to Congress
that “if we do not act, the moment will pass and we will
lose the best possibilities of our future. We face no imminent threat, be we do have an enemy. The enemy of
our time is inaction.” The exigency of Clinton’s presidency demanded American leadership because without
it the “moment will pass.” Here, the president implied
that the United States would not be beaten by an external threat, but by an internal one: our own inaction and
inability to evolve. By not leading, America could not
progress. If it could not progress, then it could not fulfill
its destiny to influence the affairs of the world. For
Clinton, then, it became imperative for the United
States to maintain, if not expand, its leadership station
to remain the “indispensable nation.” If not, then the
country’s exceptional nature was in danger.Maintaining the interventionist mission was imperative for the
Clinton administration.
Since President Clinton left office a number of happenings have damaged America’s position as world leader.
Military missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan, abuse at Abu
Ghraib, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the USA Patriot
Act, wiretapping of American citizens and other problems have only fed the fire against America’s exceptionalist interventionism and its exceptionalism in general.
Ever since President Bush decided to enter Iraq in March
of 2003, left-leaning foreign policy critics, such as Noam

Chomsky and Chalmers Johnson, have argued that the
United States is pursuing a drastic militaristic form of
interventionism that has it dangerously close to becoming an empire. On top of that, there are a growing number of conservatives who excoriate this militaristic
exceptionalism. Texas Representative Ron Paul, a 2008
candidate for president, advocates the United States
abandon its role as an interventionist state and return
to a “normal” foreign policy. Johns Hopkins University
Professor, Francis Fukuyama, a prominent neo-conservative, one-time proponent of the Iraq War and devoted
interventionist, asserts that the United States must
return to using unobtrusive strategies such as free trade
and commerce, a là Washington and Jefferson, to resuscitate its image and its leadership role. Boston
University Professor Andrew Bacevich has long been a
critic of our current U.S. interventionist role. In his new
book, The Limits of American Exceptionalism, Bacevich
maintains that our current international position is not
sustainable. The missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
billions of dollars in trade deficits, and the constant
promotion of Western-style democracy, has created a
crisis in American life that may do irrevocable damage
to its prestige and the power of its example. These
criticisms point to a much larger foreign policy conversation that rages among America’s foreign policy
intelligentsia.
It is here where I situate my current research interests.
My current research project is to trace and analyze
various enactments of this current debate. For example,
in his inaugural address, President Obama committed
the United States to maintaining and resuscitating its
leadership position. He proclaimed that America is
ready and has a responsibility to lead. At the same time,
he indicated he wanted to usher in a new era of engagement with various regions of the globe, such as the
Muslim world, based on mutual interests and mutual
respect. How does this “new era” differ from previous
administrations, such as Clinton? What adaptations
will President Obama’s administration make in the
current rhetoric regarding our role in the world, our
exceptionalist heritage and America’s foreign policy
vocabulary? What are the limits of America’s station in
international affairs? How will others, such as Ron
Paul, challenge these exceptionalist positions? At the
moment, I don’t have answers to these questions.
Ultimately, however, my book and my current research
project aim to help others understand the roots of our
current foreign policy debates, where they have taken
us in the past, and where they will take us in the future.
Understanding these positions and debates are absolutely essential for the health of U.S. foreign policy and
American democracy.
—Jason Edwards is Assistant Professor of
Communication Studies.

